QUART 25.3: The Marines’ Belated Embrace of Blue-Green Integration

By Dr. İpek İpek

When Marine amphibious combat vehicles rolled off the well deck of USS Harpers Ferry into the Pacific this past May, the scene signified more than just another training iteration—it marked a long-overdue course correction in how the Marine Corps prepares for West Coast deployments. Exercise QUART 25.3, part of the newly launched Quarterly Underway Amphibious Readiness Training series, signals a quiet but meaningful shift: a serious attempt to embed Navy decision-making into Marine pre-deployment cycles. It reflects a growing recognition that saving blue-green integration for the final weeks before sailing is not only inefficient, but also operationally reckless.

Lieutenant Colonel FD Monday’s admission that this marks the “first fiscal year” of real Navy involvement in Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) training is both welcome and alarming. For decades, the Marines have carried an identity rooted in amphibious warfare, yet they’ve trained and operated with a curious detachment from their naval counterparts. That disconnect has become increasingly untenable. Amphibious operations demand not just interoperability but fluency—shared language, rhythm, and tactical instinct—between sea and shore elements. What QUART seeks to address is less a procedural oversight than a fundamental misunderstanding of how modern maritime operations work.

Designed around the 15th MEU and Amphibious Squadron Five, the exercise was deliberately scaled in complexity yet remained tactically authentic. Using only a single landing ship dock (LSD) instead of an entire amphibious ready group (ARG) may seem modest, but it reveals a more mature approach to joint training. The Corps appears to have internalized a lesson often overlooked at the Pentagon: that operational excellence begins with mastering fundamentals, not simulating complexity.

This renewed focus became especially evident in the tactical-level integration the exercise enabled. Practicing “boat lanes” and “gator squares”—seemingly mundane naval patterns that are, in fact, critical to amphibious success—introduced a level of realism and detail rarely seen in past pre-deployment cycles. Lieutenant Colonel Ben Gallo’s involvement, bringing hard-won experience from the forward-deployed 31st MEU, further tightened the feedback loop between training design and combat realities.

The amphibious combat vehicle (ACV) operations themselves underscored both the potential and pitfalls of current doctrine. First Lieutenant Hunter Hicks described a methodical progression from static launches to low-speed underway operations, illustrating the gradual development of capability. Yet the metrics were sobering: only twelve of the eighteen prepared vehicles were operational. In a contested landing scenario, that kind of mechanical attrition could be mission-fatal. The Corps cannot afford to treat vehicle reliability as a footnote.

Other basics also remain unsettlingly underdeveloped. Capabilities such as ACV-to-ACV water transfers and vehicle towing—essential for maintaining momentum under fire—are still being treated as novel rather than routine. That a lance corporal’s insight on propeller management became platoon-wide doctrine is telling; tactical innovation should be layered onto solid institutional knowledge, rather than filling gaps in it.

The aviation component revealed similar shortfalls. Captain Robert Whitlock’s frank admission that he initially did not grasp the intricacies of flight deck coordination within amphibious settings highlights systemic gaps in joint preparation. His metaphor of “team friction” fading over time softens the reality: in combat, there is no allowance for delayed coordination. Either the team works on day one, or it fails.

Nonetheless, the Marines’ emphasis on “fundamentals before complexity” hints at meaningful institutional learning. The goal of executing 150 pilot landings throughout QUART 25.3 demonstrates real commitment to closing fundamental skill gaps—though one can’t help but ask why this hasn’t been standard practice for years. The Corps’ mythologized reputation for amphibious prowess has often papered over a lack of sustained, practical naval integration.

There are promising signs of modernization. The rollout of XR Training’s virtual reality ACV simulators, complete with haptic feedback, offers a scalable solution to training throughput limitations. The deployment of 81 units in 2024 is a significant investment. More importantly, the modular and mobile nature of these systems aligns well with the unpredictable demands of forward-deployed forces. Still, the real test is whether simulated proficiency undercuts or enhances performance under real-world stress.

QUART 25.3, in the end, is less a triumph than a belated reckoning. The broader MEU 3.0 initiative—tasked with sustaining multiple global deployments while presenting complex dilemmas to adversaries—rests entirely on the success of this kind of foundational integration. Without it, concepts like “lethal response options” and “decision-space denial,” touted by Commandant General Eric Smith, remain aspirational soundbites rather than executable strategies.

The Marines have a long history of launching reform efforts that have been affected by either budget cuts or leadership turnover. Whether QUART 25.3 signals a durable institutional shift or simply another exercise elevated by its novelty remains uncertain. What’s clear is that the Corps can no longer afford to treat naval integration as an afterthought.

For now, the image of ACVs splashing back into Harpers Ferry’s well deck stands as a symbol of progress—real, if overdue. Whether it becomes a landmark of transformation or just another fleeting initiative will depend entirely on what follows.