The Unraveling Order: Multilateral Peace Operations in Crisis

By Dr. İpek İpek

Multilateral peace operations are undergoing a profound shift—not just in scale, but in purpose and credibility. The 2024 numbers offer no simple narrative of decline; rather, they reveal a system fraying at multiple seams. While the total count of active missions declined only slightly—from 63 to 61—the collapse in international deployments is striking. With just 94,451 personnel, the field force is now 42% smaller than in 2015. This isn’t just about closures—it’s about a global recalibration of how conflict is managed, and by whom.

Nowhere is this change more visible than in Sub-Saharan Africa. The region still hosts 21 missions and three-quarters of all deployed staff, but this apparent concentration belies deeper dysfunction. Ambitions born from UN Security Council Resolution 2719—especially the promise of consistent funding for African Union-led operations—remain aspirational at best. Bureaucratic inertia and stalled implementation talks throughout 2024 left urgent African security crises suspended between vision and reality.

Haiti’s Multinational Security Support Mission (MSS) underscores the scale of this dysfunction. After prolonged diplomatic deadlock, the deployment of Kenyan police finally began in mid-2024. But even by year’s end, the force was over 2,000 personnel short of its already modest 2,500 mandate. With over 5,000 lives lost to gang violence, the mission’s dependency on voluntary funding—mostly from the United States—makes its future precarious. Especially as Washington signals waning enthusiasm for global commitments.

Somalia offers a different but equally fragile transition. The AU Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) formally concluded operations, handing bases to Somali forces as planned. However, al-Shabab’s swift resurgence exposed the fragility of this strategy. Requests by Somalia to delay further drawdowns—mirrored in the DRC—suggest a new realism among host nations about the dangers of rushing exits.

Across multiple theatres, what emerges is not merely poor implementation, but a loss of institutional confidence. Although the UN Security Council did renew all eight missions requiring annual mandates, only half passed unanimously. The council’s decisions, once bureaucratic formalities, have become battlegrounds in a wider geopolitical contest inflamed by Russia’s war in Ukraine. The push by China and Russia to block Haiti’s mission from becoming a UN-led operation is symptomatic of a new era, where even humanitarian action is filtered through strategic rivalry.

Regionalism has filled the vacuum left by multilateral retreat—but not out of choice. Since 2014, the UN has authorized only political missions, leaving regional actors to take the lead. These missions—whether in Mozambique, Mali, or the DRC—face overwhelming constraints. The SADC Mission in Mozambique never reached full strength, suffering high casualties while donor fatigue and parallel deployments stretched resources thin. Similar dysfunction afflicted East Africa’s efforts in the DRC, where the M23 rebel advance continued unabated.

This patchwork of regional responses reflects a broader unraveling. Traditional donors are redirecting funds toward national defense, while voluntary contributions fluctuate with domestic politics. The 2024 UN peacekeeping budget—cut by $700 million to $5.59 billion—is only part of the story. Delayed or withheld payments from major powers like the U.S. and China have caused liquidity crises, crippling day-to-day operations.

Premature withdrawals increasingly produce power vacuums that insurgents rapidly exploit. The aftermath of MINUSMA’s exit from Mali saw a dramatic spike in violence, while the Wagner Group’s chaotic presence only underscored the pitfalls of informal alternatives. Mozambique shows signs of repeating this cycle, with insurgents reclaiming territory as regional forces withdraw.

More troubling still is the erosion of peacekeeping norms. Increasingly militarized regional missions prioritize short-term stabilization over broader peacebuilding. Core UN values—human rights, gender parity, good governance—are being sidelined, often at the request of host states. Tactical security wins are not translating into long-term peace.

Even the principle of neutrality is under siege. The Israeli strikes that injured 19 UNIFIL peacekeepers in Lebanon are not isolated incidents but warning signs: the once-unassailable protections of peacekeeping forces are fading. That such attacks brought few consequences speaks volumes.

Looking ahead, a second Trump administration could hasten this unraveling. Proposed funding cuts would strain operations already on life support. But perhaps more consequential is the unpredictable U.S. posture at the UN—sometimes siding with China and Russia, undermining traditional consensus and weakening collective resolve.

Bilateralism is now filling the void. Rwanda has deepened its role in Mozambique post-SAMIM, and Uganda and Burundi are acting in the DRC under direct agreements with Kinshasa. These flexible arrangements may provide speed, but lack accountability, oversight, and long-term vision. The fragmentation of conflict response mechanisms is leading to turf wars, redundancies, and the risk of direct confrontations.

This isn’t just about operational failures; it’s about a crumbling architecture of global security. Without a deliberate reimagining of peace operations—one that prioritizes coordination, funding reform, and normative clarity—future missions will be defined more by necessity than strategy.

The 2024 data do not signal the end of peacekeeping—but they make clear that its current form is unsustainable. What replaces it will shape the contours of global conflict management for years to come.